How does maximal extractable value arise in Ethereum’s transaction order?
What is maximal extractable value in Ethereum? It is profit created by transaction ordering, then competed for by searchers and paid through bids to proposers.
Onchain Daily Newsroom5 min read

Maximal extractable value in Ethereum arises when someone can choose which transactions enter a block and in what order, creating profit from that control. The inputs are visible pending transactions; the action is to insert, reorder or exclude transactions; the output is value that can be split through bids to the block proposer.
The name reflects who can extract that value. The 2019 paper Flash Boys 2.0 by Daian and co-authors introduced “miner extractable value.” After Ethereum’s Merge, validators propose blocks, while specialized builders often assemble them. “Maximal” describes the broader ability to extract value through ordering, rather than tying it to miners.
A public mempool exposes pending swaps before they are included. A searcher can inspect a swap’s size and direction, then estimate how it will move a decentralized exchange’s price. On a constant-product automated market maker such as Uniswap, reserves follow x*y=k. Given the pool’s reserves and a pending trade, a bot can calculate the trade’s price impact in advance.
The ordering party can then place its own transactions around the pending swap. The crucial step is that the victim’s trade changes the pool price: a transaction placed before it can buy at the earlier price, and one placed after it can sell at the changed price. That sequence turns a predictable price movement into extractable value.
A sandwich turns a visible swap into a trading opportunity
Imagine a user submits a large token swap on Uniswap. The pool’s reserves and the swap size make its likely price impact calculable, although the final outcome can still change if other transactions arrive or the swap does not execute.
In an illustrative sandwich, a searcher buys the token immediately before the user’s swap. That buy shifts the pool price against the user. The user’s transaction then executes at the worse price allowed by its settings, such as its slippage limit. The searcher sells immediately after the user’s trade, taking advantage of the resulting price move.
Before the sequence, the user’s swap would have moved the price on its own. After it, the user still receives the tokens from the swap, but at a worse execution price; the searcher has captured the difference after transaction costs. The pool’s pricing rule did not change. The ordering did, and that is why the same swap can produce a different result for the user.
Sandwiching is one form of MEV, but not every opportunity harms a trader. Arbitrageurs trade when the same asset has different prices across decentralized exchanges. Their trades can bring those prices back into alignment. Lending protocols also create liquidation opportunities: a searcher can repay eligible debt and claim collateral under the protocol’s rules, helping keep loans solvent. Both activities use transaction ordering to capture value.
Searchers compete, and bids carry much of the value to the proposer
Searchers identify opportunities and build profitable transaction sequences. They compete for the same chance to have a sequence included in a block. That competition matters because the searcher’s gross profit is not necessarily what the searcher keeps: bids for inclusion pass much of the opportunity’s value onward.
In the MEV-Boost flow, block builders collect transactions and searcher bundles, then assemble candidate blocks. Relays pass bids and block data between builders and proposers. The proposer can select the best bid available through MEV-Boost. Searchers may therefore find and execute the opportunity, builders may assemble the profitable ordering, and the proposer receives the winning payment. Competition tends to bid most of the opportunity’s value onward, so the proposer, rather than the bot that spotted it, can receive the largest share.
Flashbots developed the Flashbots Auction and MEV-Boost as infrastructure for this competition, moving bids and block construction out of the public transaction path. Its Protect service gives users a way to submit transactions with front-running protection. This can help users avoid exposing swaps to sandwich searchers in the public mempool. It changes where a transaction is submitted; it does not change the exchange’s pricing formula or remove the economic incentive to trade around price-moving orders.
Related questions
Is MEV bad for Ethereum?
MEV has different effects depending on the opportunity. Sandwich attacks worsen a user’s execution price, while arbitrage can align prices across exchanges and liquidations can help keep loans solvent. The ordering competition can also make block inclusion valuable enough to attract bids. The practical question is who captures the value and whether the transaction sequence helps or harms users and protocol operation.
Who receives MEV profits?
The searcher may earn profit by finding an opportunity, but often bids much of its value to secure inclusion. Builders compete to assemble attractive blocks, and the proposer can receive the winning bid. The exact split depends on the opportunity and the bids, but the searcher that finds the trade does not automatically keep all of its value.
Can a regular user avoid MEV?
Users can reduce exposure by choosing transaction submission routes that shield pending swaps from public searchers, and by setting swap limits carefully. These steps can limit some sandwich risk, but they do not prevent all forms of MEV. Understanding the transaction’s price impact and how it reaches a block helps explain what protection can—and cannot—change.
MEV is value created by control over transaction ordering. A visible swap reveals a possible price move; a searcher can trade around it, and competition for block inclusion carries much of the resulting value to the proposer.